Posts Tagged ‘Amartya Sen’

New publication: ‘The Power of Ideas’ collects ‘theoretical foundations’ posts

Wednesday, December 22nd, 2010


It’s finally arrived! The most anticipated (by me at least) Policy Progress publication of 2010, The Power of Ideas: Decline and renewal in the theoretical foundations of progressive thinking, is now online.

From my foreword:

This report collects together all of my writings on the ‘Theoretical Foundations’ topic, one of the main themes for the Policy Progress website in 2010. This topic goes right to the heart of what Policy Progress has been trying to do as a policy ‘think-site’ devoted to developing and supporting progressive initiatives and ideas. Over the course of this year, I’ve tried to grapple with the history and prospects of progressive thinking and renewal. And, perhaps miraculously, I feel that the 35 or so posts that formed the basis for this report really do add up to something that hangs together.

As I said yesterday, I won’t be able to write for Policy Progress anymore next year, so I’m pleased to have managed to complete this giant compilation as a record of (much of) the year’s work.

You can download a copy here.

We value what we measure

Tuesday, December 14th, 2010

This is the third and final part of a series of posts about contemporary progressive thinkers who challenge the ‘conventional wisdom’ about economic growth. Part one looked at Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett’s The Spirit Level and part two looked at Tim Jackson’s Prosperity without Growth.

Wilkinson, Pickett and Jackson suggest that economic growth should no longer be — even cannot be — central to the progressive project. But what about those within the economics profession itself?

Joseph Stiglitz is a U.S. Nobel prize-winner, former chief economist of the World Bank, and author of Globalisation and Its Discontents and Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy. Amartya Sen, born in India, is also a Nobel prize-winner, and the author of Development as Freedom and The Idea of Justice. Both are highly-regarded progressive economists.

In 2008 and 2009, together with Jean Paul Fitoussi (a distinguished French economist), they headed a Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress set up by President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, who felt that existing measures like Gross Domestic Product (GDP) didn’t tell a full and proper picture of the economy or society.

The Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission produced a lengthy, thoughtful and thorough report. They argued that GDP was indeed a partial and often misleading measure, and proposed reform across three dimensions. First, classical GDP statistics needed to be refined to better take account of things like income distribution and the actual value of public services. Secondly, there was a need to complement GDP with measures of ‘quality of life’, including both purely subjective aspects such as happiness, and more objective factors drawn from Sen’s ‘capability framework’. Thirdly, we need to measure and track the sustainability of our economy, defined quite precisely as whether “at least the current level of well-being can be maintained for future generations” — for this the Commission argued that an approach based on changes in resource stocks (which Tim Jackson would recognise) would be needed.

Across all three dimensions, the Commission’s arguments are well-developed and compelling, although they were clear that their report was very much a starting point for what would be a complex exercise of statistical reform.

And, while predominantly an expert technical process, their work is likely to have important policy consequences and implications for progressive thinking. This is because the way we account for things helps determine the way we see the world. What we measure, we value; and, too often, if it isn’t measured, it slips out of view. This was a central theme of New Zealand politician and academic Marilyn Waring’s feminist critique of economic statistics, Counting for Nothing, back in 1988, and this work is very much in that vein.

In a ‘Reflections’ paper accompanying the main report, Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi are more explicit about this aspect of their project:

It is our belief that an open discussion of the issues – and problems – involved in measuring economic performance and social progress provides an important context within which societies can engage in critical debates about societal values. (p. 27)

Otherwise, the “risk is that as countries strive to increase measured GDP, they take actions which now, or in the future, may actually lower societal well-being” (p. 10). This can be seen with the environment:

Countries that enjoy high living standards today by depleting their inheritance of natural resources – without investing the proceeds – are “robbing” future generations. It is possible that doing this does not even increase their welfare, as people usually care about the well-being of their children, but they may unintentionally act this way, at least partially because they are not informed, absent the right metric. (p. 10)

And even with the recent Global Financial Crisis:

Many concluded, for instance, that financial deregulation was good, because it led to rapid expansion of the financial industry and an increase in measured GDP. We now know that that growth was not sustainable; that much of the profits earned in 2004-2007 might more appropriately be looked at as winnings in gambling by some, which were more than offset by the losses in 2008, and the following years, by others. (p. 11)

What, therefore, are the likely implications of measuring things in a broader and more accurate way? How would this approach, if implemented, be likely to inform the further development and renewal of progressive ‘theoretical foundations’?

In some respects, it would likely be compatible with the arguments of The Spirit Level and Prosperity without Growth. We would become more aware of which types of societal and economic development were having the most positive (or negative) impact on quality of life, and whether we were on a sustainable path. The Commission’s work can’t at this stage point to whether a strict path of de-growth is necessary, as Jackson argues, but would nevertheless encourage us to see the quantum of economic activity as just one set of factors in achieving progressive goals of equitable wellbeing. Metrics on things like leisure, happiness and political voice would help to provide a broader picture.

A secondary but still important consequence might be to counter negative images of the effectiveness of public services. The modern image of the public sector languishes under the constant suspicion of inefficiency and dysfunction, a far cry from the chilling efficiency of ‘bureaucratic authority’ depicted by Weber and which (I have argued) helped underpin the Keynesian-era confidence in the state. Cautiously, without wishing to prejudge, the Stiglitiz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission suggests that if we could better measure the value and not simply the input costs of non-market public activity, we may see a more positive picture of improved value over time (often in form of better quality and more effective services in areas like health and education, rather than larger volumes).

That may be one more way in which the seemingly mundane process of statistical reform could transform the way we see things, and deconstruct some of the statistical ’story’ that neoliberalism has constructed about the primacy of growth and markets.

Links:

  • The main Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission report.
  • The accompanying ‘Reflections and Overview’ paper from Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi.
  • My earlier post on Weber.

The state, market and society out of balance [re-post]

Friday, September 3rd, 2010

Originally posted on 6 May 2010.

In the middle of last year, James Purnell almost brought down Gordon Brown.

His resignation as Work and Pensions Secretary and his call for Brown “to stand aside to give Labour a fighting chance of winning the next election” precipitated the nearest thing to a coup that Brown has faced.

Shortly afterwards, Purnell reinvented himself as the head of Open Left, “a project aimed at renewing the thinking and ideas of the political Left”, hosted by the Demos thinktank.

I was in London at the time of Open Left’s launch, and was struck by the fact that at 39 (about the same age as me) Purnell had already worked for a thinktank (ippr), as a Downing Street staffer, and begun and finished a career as a senior Cabinet minister. Now he was off to rethink the progressive movement!

(New Zealand seems quite stately by comparison — here even a politician like Labour MP Grant Robertson can hope for a successful political career, despite being such a late-comer to Parliament!)

When I saw Purnell on the BBC’s Newsnight programme, though, I wasn’t that impressed. He seemed on the back foot, and his call for a focus on pursuing “equality of capability” came across as either incoherent or a way to avoid a commitment to any real redistributive agenda. I wasn’t alone; there were a lot of negative responses.

So, while I was intrigued by the promise of Open Left, when I came across a podcast of Purnell’s lecture at the London School of Economics (LSE) entitled Renewing the Left’s ideology: what should be the principles and goals of the centre-Left today?, I didn’t have high hopes.

My mistake – it’s an impressive presentation. Some of the themes are familiar from Newsnight, but not only does Purnell have the scope here to do justice to his borrowings from Richard Tawney and Amartya Sen, he has also learnt from previous missteps and thought carefully about how best to communicate his ideas in crisp and direct terms:

I think a better way of translating [Sen's] ideas is to talk about power. His idea of capability is what most people would understand as having the power to do or be something. His idea of a functioning would be what people actually decide to do with that power.

There follows a rich and inter-connected argument about the need for balance between the state, market and society:

. . . we need to create the conditions for people to take power and for society to be reciprocal . . . With state, society and markets in balance, each is less likely to crowd the other out and then, and only then, can people flourish.

I want to just pick up on a particular strand of this, which is the discussion of a particular way in which things have got out of balance:

If you believe in open markets but are not prepared to tolerate that injustice, you also need a strong state to alleviate the consequences of the market. That is the story of New Labour – trying to harness the best of markets, then correcting their failures through the state.

The consequence of these good intentions is that the state has been too strong in respect of society, and not strong enough in respect of markets. Our unwillingness to be more hands on with the market has required us to be too hands on with the state.

Some of the most interesting points come up in the question and answer segment. However, while the LSE has helpfully provided a transcript of Purnell’s speech, which is a valuable reference, this segment is only found on the audio.

In reply to one question [at 47.19 minutes], Purnell talks about how New Labour fell into this imbalance:

I’d say we came into power actually with a quite bold set of reforms for restructuring market power: trade union legislation, the minimum wage most obviously, four weeks paid leave. But we didn’t actually renew that. So we came in with good democratic reforms, good market reforms, but over time we came to rely more and more on public services and redistribution. And that’s I think because of this point that we became hands off with the market and therefore we had to be too hands on with the state . . . You end up having to put very, very much more pressure on the state and I would say that can be self-defeating.

Purnell traces this [at 103:01 minutes] back to :

. . . what happened to Labour after 1945, that we were sort of the victims of our own success. The creation of the welfare state was so successful, in practice and also in politics, that actually we forgot the other things that we had, and we became to a certain extent sceptical of them . . . Certainly the ‘97 [Blair] government became pretty reluctant to alter market outcomes. It wasn’t impossible, but the starting point was the market outcome, and you then had to prove the case against it. And certainly became less confident about how you could use society to achieve those changes.

(Note the parallels with Kay’s critique of New Labour’s reliance on the ‘market failure doctrine’.)

Against this Purnell argues [102:21]:

. . . that we should recapture that Croslandite idea that inequality is clearly something that undermines people’s ability to be powerful, and our society to be reciprocal . . . but also that, in trying to achieve that, we should not try and do it all through the state nor do it all to people. . . . People can’t just be passively equal, . . . you can’t just do it through redistribution. People have to take their own power if it’s to actually feel real to them and feel just to everybody else.

There’s some really fascinating ideas there (and others I haven’t even touched on here). I’d encourage everybody to read, or listen to, this lecture for themselves. I’m particularly interested by the tension it highlights between redistribution after the fact on the one hand, and intervening to alter the initial market outcomes on the other. In Thursday’s post [published 6 May] I’ll explore how that relates to the New Zealand experience.

In the meantime, what do you think of James Purnell has to say in this lecture, and about the whole Open Left project?

Note – the ideas in Purnell’s lecture are explored further in the Open Left/Demos publication We mean power: ideas for the future of the left.

Why the progressive movement should talk more about economics

Wednesday, June 9th, 2010

Many people think that economics is a right-leaning discipline. They are wrong, and we need to tell them.

One common caricature of politics is that the ideological right attracts a homogenous cadre of serious-yet-uncaring bean counters, while the left attracts a rag-tag mob of caring, sharing mush-heads.

Stated this way, the caricature is obviously silly. But many progressives do not help their own credibility when they avoid talking about economics, thus lending credence to the false notion that all economists support the right.

While there is a pretty strong consensus in favour of free trade among academic economists, there are in fact sharp divisions within the profession on all other important matters of economic policy.

Yet the false perception of a right-leaning consensus endures, for two reasons: selective reporting of economists’ findings by some entrepreneurial commentators; and a preference among many progressives to talk around rather than about economic policy.

This particular think-site, of course, suffers from no such economic shyness, and nor do one or two of the authors at The Standard. But the strong economic analyses on these websites are sadly not reflected around much of the rest of the progressive movement.

If folk on the left are to challenge the caricature that they are economic illiterates swimming against the tide, we need – all of us – to confront economic issues much more directly.

Helpfully, four of the world’s most prominent economists have recently suggested progressive solutions to the world’s largest economic problems. That should help us to stop being coy.

Nobel laureates Joseph Stiglitz and Amartya Sen recently spearheaded a French economic commission that made a remarkable recommendation. After decades of measuring human progress using a purely financial measure (GDP), Stiglitz and Sen suggested that we instead measure human progress more broadly.

This recommendation draws on a wider “happiness economics” research agenda, which holds that human action is successful only in as much as it makes humans feel better about their lives. This is actually a pretty standard economic idea – the idea of utility. All people are doing with happiness economics (or, if you prefer, with Genuine Progress Indicators) is measuring utility better. Any attempt to measure the success of an economy using only financial measures like GDP misses this wider point.

The heroic assumption that more money necessarily makes people happier has been shown untrue in a large number of circumstances. For example, the near doubling of American GDP since 1950 has had no impact at all on their collective happiness. And in a recent ranking of “happy life years,” the top five nations were Costa Rica, Iceland, Denmark, Switzerland, and Canada – none of which crack the top five in terms of material wealth.

The right of course, has mocked happiness economics. A mere poll of feelings, they argued, was an impractical and fanciful way to judge progress (although that never stopped them when it came to measuring “business confidence”). Despite this shallow critique, Genuine Progress Indicators are catching on, and progressives everywhere should be singing their virtues.

Paul Krugman, another recent Nobel laureate, recently showed how the right’s belief in the “efficient markets hypothesis” lead them to completely misdiagnose the recent financial crisis. The efficient markets hypothesis says that the price of any asset is an accurate reflection of all available information about it. But it has no way of explaining the panic and implosion that engulfed major sectors of the American markets in 2008. The journalist Michael Lewis has made similar observations.

Any economic theory that misses the big real-world events, needless to say, is of only dubious usefulness. Social scientific theories are only as good as their empirical validity.

One especially welcome innovation in the area of explaining panic among supposedly rational economic agents is to juxtapose traditional economic theory with recent practical work on human behavior. Whereas traditional economists had tended to just assume that people are individually economically rational, behavioural economists have gone and tested those propositions against real world experience. And when we look in the real world, non-rational behaviour is surprisingly easy to find.

Jeffrey Sachs, a Full Professor of economics at Harvard at the age of 29, will likely win the Nobel Peace Prize for development work in Africa. A former darling of the right for his developmental prescription of “shock therapy” for third-world governments, Sachs has also recently “gone mushy.” He has embraced an activist role for both national governments and the UN, and has also explicitly rejected the claims from the right that expansive Scandinavian-style welfare systems are a drain on the economy.

These four stand at the pinnacle of the global economics profession. They all propose progressive policies and oppose neoclassical economic orthodoxy. Their stances show that economics is no guaranteed friend of the right. Progressives need to seize on these and other developments within economics, including the influential book The Spirit Level, to help us think about policy and to better make our case to the New Zealand people.

Links:

—-

A native Wellingtonian, Rob Salmond now lives in the US. He is Assistant Professor of political science at the University of Michigan, and is also currently a Visiting Scholar in the department of political science at Stanford University. Rob’s academic areas of interest include legislative institutions, political media, and political economy, all with a cross-national focus.

The state, market and society out of balance

Tuesday, May 4th, 2010

In the middle of last year, James Purnell almost brought down Gordon Brown.

His resignation as Work and Pensions Secretary and his call for Brown “to stand aside to give Labour a fighting chance of winning the next election” precipitated the nearest thing to a coup that Brown has faced.

Shortly afterwards, Purnell reinvented himself as the head of Open Left, “a project aimed at renewing the thinking and ideas of the political Left”, hosted by the Demos thinktank.

I was in London at the time of Open Left’s launch, and was struck by the fact that at 39 (about the same age as me) Purnell had already worked for a thinktank (ippr), as a Downing Street staffer, and begun and finished a career as a senior Cabinet minister. Now he was off to rethink the progressive movement!

(New Zealand seems quite stately by comparison — here even a politician like Labour MP Grant Robertson can hope for a successful political career, despite being such a late-comer to Parliament!)

When I saw Purnell on the BBC’s Newsnight programme, though, I wasn’t that impressed. He seemed on the back foot, and his call for a focus on pursuing “equality of capability” came across as either incoherent or a way to avoid a commitment to any real redistributive agenda. I wasn’t alone; there were a lot of negative responses.

So, while I was intrigued by the promise of Open Left, when I came across a podcast of Purnell’s lecture at the London School of Economics (LSE) entitled Renewing the Left’s ideology: what should be the principles and goals of the centre-Left today?, I didn’t have high hopes.

My mistake – it’s an impressive presentation. Some of the themes are familiar from Newsnight, but not only does Purnell have the scope here to do justice to his borrowings from Richard Tawney and Amartya Sen, he has also learnt from previous missteps and thought carefully about how best to communicate his ideas in crisp and direct terms:

I think a better way of translating [Sen's] ideas is to talk about power. His idea of capability is what most people would understand as having the power to do or be something. His idea of a functioning would be what people actually decide to do with that power.

There follows a rich and inter-connected argument about the need for balance between the state, market and society:

. . . we need to create the conditions for people to take power and for society to be reciprocal . . . With state, society and markets in balance, each is less likely to crowd the other out and then, and only then, can people flourish.

I want to just pick up on a particular strand of this, which is the discussion of a particular way in which things have got out of balance:

If you believe in open markets but are not prepared to tolerate that injustice, you also need a strong state to alleviate the consequences of the market. That is the story of New Labour – trying to harness the best of markets, then correcting their failures through the state.

The consequence of these good intentions is that the state has been too strong in respect of society, and not strong enough in respect of markets. Our unwillingness to be more hands on with the market has required us to be too hands on with the state.

Some of the most interesting points come up in the question and answer segment. However, while the LSE has helpfully provided a transcript of Purnell’s speech, which is a valuable reference, this segment is only found on the audio.

In reply to one question [at 47.19 minutes], Purnell talks about how New Labour fell into this imbalance:

I’d say we came into power actually with a quite bold set of reforms for restructuring market power: trade union legislation, the minimum wage most obviously, four weeks paid leave. But we didn’t actually renew that. So we came in with good democratic reforms, good market reforms, but over time we came to rely more and more on public services and redistribution. And that’s I think because of this point that we became hands off with the market and therefore we had to be too hands on with the state . . . You end up having to put very, very much more pressure on the state and I would say that can be self-defeating.

Purnell traces this [at 103:01 minutes] back to :

. . . what happened to Labour after 1945, that we were sort of the victims of our own success. The creation of the welfare state was so successful, in practice and also in politics, that actually we forgot the other things that we had, and we became to a certain extent sceptical of them . . . Certainly the ‘97 [Blair] government became pretty reluctant to alter market outcomes. It wasn’t impossible, but the starting point was the market outcome, and you then had to prove the case against it. And certainly became less confident about how you could use society to achieve those changes.

(Note the parallels with Kay’s critique of New Labour’s reliance on the ‘market failure doctrine’.)

Against this Purnell argues [102:21]:

. . . that we should recapture that Croslandite idea that inequality is clearly something that undermines people’s ability to be powerful, and our society to be reciprocal . . . but also that, in trying to achieve that, we should not try and do it all through the state nor do it all to people. . . . People can’t just be passively equal, . . . you can’t just do it through redistribution. People have to take their own power if it’s to actually feel real to them and feel just to everybody else.

There’s some really fascinating ideas there (and others I haven’t even touched on here). I’d encourage everybody to read, or listen to, this lecture for themselves. I’m particularly interested by the tension it highlights between redistribution after the fact on the one hand, and intervening to alter the initial market outcomes on the other. In Thursday’s post I’ll explore how that relates to the New Zealand experience.

In the meantime, what do you think of James Purnell has to say in this lecture, and about the whole Open Left project?

Note – the ideas in Purnell’s lecture are explored further in the Open Left/Demos publication We mean power: ideas for the future of the left.

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