Posts Tagged ‘KiwiSaver’

Our first publication – collecting Peter Harris on superannuation

Thursday, December 16th, 2010

I’m very pleased to announce our first online publication: a collection of the three guest-posts that Peter Harris wrote on superannuation and retirement savings issues back in May, June and August.

From my foreword:

National’s decision to suspend contributions to the New Zealand Superannuation Fund last year renewed fears about the sustainability of Superannuation. There are concerns, including amongst some progressives, that perhaps our ageing population means that we cannot afford to maintain the current wage relativity and universal entitlement from the age of 65 indefinitely.

This is an important issue for progressives (and all New Zealanders) to debate, and there’s no one more qualified to write about it than Peter. He has a long involvement with these issues from his time as economist for the Council of Trade Unions and later as economic adviser to Dr Michael Cullen. Following that, he went on to chair the Savings Product Working Group, whose report was the founding document for what evolved into the KiwiSaver scheme. His views on superannuation, savings and retirement are always worth hearing and considering carefully.

You can download a copy here.

Very handy for passing on to friends who refuse to read blogs!

Super: time for a change?

Tuesday, August 17th, 2010

This is the third in a set of posts on savings and pensions issues from Peter Harris. The other two posts in the series are Good policy process – the case of New Zealand Superannuation and Why compulsory savings should not be on the agenda.


The recent Retirement Commission/ Institute of Policy Studies workshop on retirement income and intergenerational equity reached three roughly uncontested conclusions, at least in respect to the New Zealand Superannuation scheme.

It is very effective at minimising poverty among the elderly. (Just how effective is contestable, but “the best in the world” is basically true). It is relatively cheap by international standards. It is not particularly effective in maintaining in retirement the incomes people earned when working. So we know it is effective and efficient.  It also protects the retired from inflation and longevity risk. (It is “the gold standard” as one international participant put it).

We should celebrate, not lament, the fact that it does not replicate in retirement all of the market inequities of working life. That should never be a role for the government. Countries that try to do that typically impose some form of compulsion on savings, and compensate with tax concessions on said savings. The net effect is no discernable reduction in pensioner poverty, a significant increase in the fiscal costs of retirement income policy, and a fair bit of transfer of savings into tax advantaged or legally obligatory vehicles, rather than an increase in savings levels. The policy becomes less efficient, and, if it ends up displacing some or all of universal tax funded pensions, less effective and more inequitable. (Advocates of compulsory KiwiSaver please note).

If there is an efficient and effective programme in place, it would seem to me that there has to be a high standard of evidence needed to erode it. The “evidence” tended to revolve around demographic projections suggesting that in 2060, there would be four people 65+ for every ten of working age, compared with only two now. That is a rhetorically powerful, but analytically bankrupt, comparison.

If this “ratio” is definitive as an indicator of fiscal sustainability, we have a problem that is of an order of magnitude greater than whether NZS is affordable. There will be fewer people of working age for every hospital patient, school pupil, university student, police officer, prison inmate, kilometre of road needed to be built, and so on. Admittedly, with most of those, the numbers that taxpayers need to support is not increasing at the same time, except for health, where dependency might well be increasing at an even greater rate.

The fact is that it is GDP that drives the tax base, and the tax base that determines the affordability of any and everything.

Changes in the demographic structure have to impact on GDP growth to be at all relevant to the debate, and then to a material extent. All we had at the workshop was a much less scary suggestion that changes in the demographic structure would reduce trend GDP growth from 3 to 2 percent per annum. But how robust is this projection?

My (admittedly sketchy) understanding of the Treasury model that reaches such conclusions is that it derives GDP growth  trend changes through a projection of hours worked and an assumed rate of productivity growth. If that is wrong, I make no apology. My point is that if the public is being asked to buy into major shifts in (effective and efficient!)  fundamental life cycle income supports, it should be based on more than “trust Treasury”.

A fifty year projection of trends is not just heroic, its nuts. Think back fifty years. Ignoring the EU, globalisation, China etc etc, consider just two technological changes that impacted trends since then: the pill and the computer. They fundamentally shifted birth and labour force participation rates and productivity. Policy based on projections of 1960s demographic, participation and productivity trends would have produced a (with hindsight) laughable prescription.

Even now, labour force participation rates for the 65+ age group show a steeply rising trend. We need a better understanding and more effective monitoring of factors that are driving the tax base, and changes in the demographic structure might well be one such. But it is manifestly not the only one, and almost certainly not the most important one.

My suggestion? Establish a very high evidential threshold for trashing key public welfare programmes. The more effective those programmes are judged to be, the higher the threshold needs to be set. Monitor and adjust in line with evidence, not theoretical or speculative projections. Consider all options, not just a cut in the programme. With NZS, we are talking about a 3-point-something of GDP increase in the cost of sustaining it. Cracking down on rampant and systemic tax avoidance, pre-funding, and ultimately a small increase in some tax rates seem to be much less socially disruptive options.

Right now, the case for fundamental changes to New Zealand Superannuation, like the war in Iraq, has not been made.

Peter Harris is an economist who specialises in public policy, the labour market, and primary industry issues. He has been Economist for the Council of Trade Unions (CTU) and economic adviser to Dr Michael Cullen. Peter was also chair of the Savings Product Working Group, whose report was the founding document for what evolved into the KiwiSaver scheme. Further biographical details can be found here.

Why compulsory savings should not be on the agenda

Wednesday, June 23rd, 2010

“Compulsory Kiwisaver” is bubbling up on the agenda, the latest being a call for it at the recent stock exchange AGM. It is easy to see why the NZX wants it. Not only does it add liquidity to the capital market, but somebody else (the government) does all the hard work – and carries all the cost – in raising the capital, collecting it, distributing it to investment agencies and regulating providers. The quintessential “free lunch”!

There are four strong reasons to resist making Kiwisaver compulsory:

  • If the government is going to tell people how to allocate a part of their incomes, compulsion would almost certainly have to be backed by some form of compensation and protection, either through extended tax concessions and/or capital guarantees, and intrusive regulation and supervision of providers. This increases the chances that a larger proportion of Kiwisaver balances will simply be savings transfers (as savers chase the bigger subsidies and extended protection), not net new savings.
  • There is a risk that with compulsion, savings levels could actually be artificially capped. The government is telling me to save, therefore it is also by implication telling me how much to save. (It knows better than me).
  • With compulsion, rules are required for withdrawal (emigration, hardship, matrimonial property settlements, ill-health etc). These become incredibly complex and arbitrary, and tend to generate resentment, which works against promoting a savings culture.
  • Compulsion tends to be inequitable because it captures a portion of savings that some people make reluctantly (otherwise a voluntary system would be sufficient) and transfers it to preferred providers, who are typically quite well paid: it takes money off people who don’t want to use it that way to support the earnings of finance industry employees.

The net effect is a small – or potentially minimalist – increase in savings levels, won at considerable fiscal cost, excessive regulatory prescription on both saver and provider, and much more complexity.

Worse though, it sets up the pre-conditions for ending or scaling back the flat rate, universal New Zealand Superannuation. If people have to save, there is a perception that this is because NZS is on the way out. There can be no other legitimisation of compulsion. If people want to save (to augment NZS) that is entirely a private matter.  The perceptions and the politics work to divide opinion and diffuse commitment to defending NZS.

Remember that NZS is fundamentally equitable: it does not try to replicate in retirement the inequities that emerge during working life, it protects those (typically women) who live longest, it fences inflation risk off and it compensates (in part) for the fact that some retirees leave paid work with few financial assets. It is though, barely adequate as a retirement income. It is not generous.

Augmenting it is an entirely legitimate choice, but it is a private choice.

Last week, my son had a letter from his KiwiSaver provider reminding him that as a part time worker (he is a student) he had not qualified for his full tax credit, and that if he wanted it he would need to make an additional contribution before the end of the tax year. Sadly, his response was that he had better do that because the whole point of KiwiSaver was to replace the existing pension!

This compulsion thing is corrosive. NZS is worth saving.

_____________________

Peter Harris is an economist who specialises in public policy, the labour market, and primary industry issues. He has been Economist for the Council of Trade Unions (CTU) and economic adviser to Dr Michael Cullen. Peter was also chair of the Savings Product Working Group, whose report was the founding document for what evolved into the KiwiSaver scheme. Further biographical details can be found here.

Peter’s previous post for Policy Progress was Good policy process – the case of New Zealand Superannuation.

Budget 2010 puts the squeeze on progressive ambitions

Tuesday, May 25th, 2010

I’m going to avoid doing a Budget post-mortem on this blog. I’ve recommended a handful of good progressive analytical pieces in last Friday’s newsletter, and I would add Rod Oram’s Sunday column, Budget won’t budge economy out of morass, to that list.

I want to restrict my own comments to discussing a particular challenge that the Budget poses for the next progressive government, in a way that dovetails into our Progressive Fiscal Policy work programme topic.

Looking at the Budget documentation, I was interested by a graph that, according to Finance Minister Bill English, showed that, “New spending allowances between 2003 and 2008 tended to be large relative to the size of the economy, and even then were repeatedly exceeded.”

I asked the Treasury for a copy of the data for the graph, and was impressed by their prompt response. I’ve therefore reproduced the graph, with the addition of data labels on the columns, below.

Source: Treasury

The ’spending allowance’ for a Budget is set by the government in advance, often at the beginning of the parliamentary term, and gives people an indication of how much the government intends to spend on new initiatives in each Budget.

Personally, I’m not particularly concerned that the Fifth Labour Government exceeded the ’spending allowances’ it set for itself (nor, for that matter, does the figure demonstrate that they were “large relative to the size of the economy”). Without the context of the economic situation at the time and state of the operating balance, these ‘allowances’ have very little meaning. In fact, I’m inclined to feel that their existence was mainly to pacify those who saw additional government spending as a necessary evil, to be kept to an absolute minimum wherever possible.

I would also note that 70% of the cumulative spending in excess of the ‘allowances’ over 2003-08 took place in Budget 2007. Arguably, the main reason for this was the enhancement of KiwiSaver, which cost $1.2 billion by year three. This was a major initiative intended to significantly increase saving levels in the New Zealand economy, which in turn would “strengthen capital markets and contribute to higher living standards”. It should be judged on whether it achieved these aims, and whether it did so in the most cost-effective manner possible — not on how well it reconciled to some ’spending allowance’ set the previous year.

Past years’ spending allowances are therefore of limited use or interest, but this figure provides a valuable service in bringing together the actual amount of spending on Budget initiatives from the past 8 Budgets together in one place.

it is important to emphasise that these figures cover only ‘Budget initiatives’ — in other words, deliberate spending choices of the government of the day. This differs from most of the analysis of government spending (including, by necessity, my earlier post on this topic), which includes automatic adjustments (like population increases to school rolls and CPI increases to benefits) and also the pipeline effect of earlier government decisions.

So it gives a rather different perspective on fiscal policy.

On the other hand, these figures do have their limitations. They relate to different time periods and therefore can’t really be added together to form an aggregate picture of a government’s fiscal record. As best I can tell, each figure represents the average spending on Budget commitments per year over the first four years covered by that Budget — this may tend to understate (or overstate) the long-term costs if the costs of some large initiatives grow (or decline) in outyears. So the figures relate to differing time periods.

Nevertheless, they do provide a good idea of how ambitious (or spendthrift, depending on your perspective) each Budget was at the time. It’s quite apparent how different the Fifth Labour Government’s Budgets were from the two most recent Budgets from National.

Moreover, we can also compare them to the amount available for spending in the next term (and the one after that), because the ’spending allowances’ for those Budgets have already been set.

And this is where the challenge becomes apparent.

In Budget 2009, Bill English adjusted down the ’spending allowances’ for future Budgets as one of his measures to bring down future deficits and reduce the long-term growth in Crown debt. In fact, as Keith Ng astutely identified at the time, this change accounted for a greater impact on Crown debt by 2023 than the deferral of the tax cuts (remember them?), the spending cuts (which brought in relatively trivial amounts in the big fiscal scheme of things), or even the ten-year ‘holiday’ from the New Zealand Superannuation Fund.

These lower ’spending allowances’, which were reiterated in Budget 2010, are set alongside the ’spending allowances’ from 2003-2008 in the following graph:

Source: 2003-08, as above; 2012-17, Fiscal Strategy Model

(From 2014/15, allowances are exclusive of approximately $320 million “that is already included in projected baselines as a result of demographic growth”.)

Now, of course, as the experience of 2003-08 demonstrates, governments don’t always stick to their own ’spending allowances’, let alone those set by a previous government. Which is why English’s ‘wizardry’ in tackling long-term indebtedness is rather illusory.

On the other hand, a government’s ability to exceed those allowances is dependent on them being able to find revenue from somewhere to do so — especially when the Crown accounts are already projected to be in deficit until 2016.

And it is likely that the new flatter tax structure that National has created will be less susceptible to fiscal drag creating unexpected tax revenue windfalls, as happened repeatedly to the Fifth Labour Government.

That places a dilemma upon the progressive movement, as we look towards the next progressive government.

It seems likely that we would need to significantly curb our ambitions, at least in terms of additional public spending, or else come up with new revenue measures with which to fund them.